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ABSTRACT Spectrum sharing has been proposed as a promising way to increase the efficiency of spectrum
usage by allowing incumbent operators (IOs) to share their allocated radio resources with licensee operators
(LOs), under a set of agreed rules. The goal is to maximize a common utility, such as the sum rate throughput,
while maintaining the level of service required by the IOs. However, this is only guaranteed under the
assumption that all ‘‘players’’ respect the agreed sharing rules. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive
framework for licensed shared access (LSA) networks that discourages LO misbehavior. Our framework is
built around three core functions: misbehavior detection via the employment of a dedicated sensing network;
a penalization function; and, a behavior-driven resource allocation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first time that these components are combined for the monitoring/policing of the spectrum under the LSA
framework. Moreover, a novel simulator for LSA is provided as an open access tool, serving the purpose of
testing and validating our proposed techniques via a set of extensive system-level simulations in the context
of mobile network operators, where IOs and several competing LOs are considered. The results demonstrate
that violation of the agreed sharing rules can lead to a great loss of resources for the misbehaving LOs,
the amount of which is controlled by the system. Finally, we promote that including a policy enforcement
function as part of the spectrum sharing system can be beneficial for the LSA system, since it can guarantee
compliance with the spectrum sharing rules and limit the short-term benefits arising from misbehavior.
INDEX TERMS Spectrum sharing, licensed shared access (LSA), misbehavior detection, mobile network
operators (MNO), policy enforcement framework, system-level simulator, dedicated sensing network (DSN).
I. INTRODUCTION
The increased demand for spectrum, over the past few years,
has led to research directions that were considered inconceiv-
able a few decades ago. One of the pursued paths has led to the
establishment of spectrum sharing, which was predominantly
based on the concept of Cognitive Radio (CR) [1], [2]. Later,
more structured sharing frameworks such as Licensed Shared
Access (LSA) and SpectrumAccess Sharing (SAS) have been
introduced in Europe and in the United States, respectively;
these are built on a central controller that assists different
tiers of spectrum users to access common bands, according
to some agreed policies [3]. Their major difference lies in the
fact that the SAS is designed to ensure coexistence with IOs
which are not able to provide any a priori information to a
central database, as opposed to the LSA.
Despite its promising outlook and the registered inter-
est from a range of industrial players, spectrum sharing
is still met with quite some skepticism by the National
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), holding back its deploy-
ment, especially across Europe. Among the major concerns
is the lack of guarantee that spectrum users can be effec-
tively offered interference-free and QoS-assured access to
spectrum. Attempting to access the spectrum during non-
granted slots would inevitably result in harmful interference
and QoS performance degradation. To this day, the LSA
framework, which is defined by the European Electronic
VOLUME 6, 2018
2169-3536 
 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
11793
C. Galiotto et al.: Unlocking the Deployment of Spectrum Sharing With a Policy Enforcement Framework
Communications Committee (ECC) report in [4], does not
specify how to prevent LSA players from accessing non-
granted resources and, currently, interference avoidance
relies on the incumbents’ and LSA licensees’ commitment
to fully comply with the agreed rules.
Therefore, monitoring violations and preventing misbe-
having activity (either intentional or unintentional) is one
of the key enablers for the adoption of spectrum sharing by
NRAs, as well as the industry.
In this work, we present a novel approach for discour-
aging misbehavior in an LSA system,1 where several LOs
contend for the same resources. We specifically focus on the
misbehavior of LOs trying to access LSA channels during
forbidden time slots. Furthermore, we propose a detection
mechanism on top of the LSA architecture that can carry out
the misbehavior detection and the penalization in a central-
ized manner. The proposed policy enforcement framework is
composed of:
• a Dedicated Sensing Network (DSN) operating in real-
time according to a detection algorithm,
• a penalization function that assigns a penalty score for
each LO according to its behavior,
• a resource allocation strategy that takes into account the
penalty scores.
It should be noted that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first time that these different components are unified under
the context of spectrum sharing in LSA networks.
For the validation of the proposed framework, and due to
the lack of a suitable tool, we have developed a system-level
simulator for LSA networks that incorporates the functional-
ity of misbehavior detection. It is implemented in Matlab and
is offered as open source code in [5]. Our system-level results
demonstrate that penalizing licensee misbehavior, by restrict-
ing its access to the shared resources, eradicates potential ben-
efits frommisbehaving activity. Therefore, LOs aremotivated
to fully comply with the agreed sharing rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First,
we provide an overview of the related work in Section II.
In Section III, we present the considered LSA system archi-
tecture and topology. A description of the policy enforce-
ment approach is provided in Section IV. In Section V, we
present the basic components of the LSA system-level sim-
ulator. Section VI describes our system-level results. Finally,
in Section VII, we summarize our findings.
II. RELATED WORK
Spectrum sharing is a broad area of research that has been
extensively investigated, in particular after the introduction
of Cognitive Radio and Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA)
concepts [6], [7], [8]. However, the proposed work for pol-
icy enforcement in spectrum sharing environments is rather
limited. A classification of different approaches to policy
enforcement has been presented in [9], where the authors
1In principle, the policy enforcement framework can be applied to SAS as
well. However, it is not the direction that we followed in this work.
distinguish between two main categories. The first category
includes the ex-ante approaches, i.e., measures that aim at
preventing misbehavior (e.g., device certification or testing to
ensure devices follow specific spectrum access procedures).
The second category is comprised of the ex-post approaches,
in which action is taken after the occurrence of misbehav-
ior and implies sanctions such as restrictions to spectrum
access. Our proposed policy enforcement belongs to the latter
category.
Due to the wide variety of existing spectrum access
schemes, each proposed solution needs to be tailored to dif-
ferent system requirements, such as the availability of cen-
tralized controller, the hierarchy in terms of spectrum access
rights among different tiers of users, cost of implementation,
etc. Among all, the solutions to spectrum policy enforcement
that most closely relate to our approach are [6], [7], and [8].
In [6], Maruenda-Hernández et al. consider policy enforce-
ment for dynamic spectrum leasing, where IOs dynamically
change the amount of spectrum they are willing to share.
This is achieved by modifying the threshold of the tolera-
ble interference, while the LOs adjust their transmit power
accordingly. The detection of potential spectrum violations
is performed by the IOs via the evaluation of the cross-
correlation between the IO’s and the LO’s signals. In case of
violation detection by either the IOs or the LOs, a penalty
is applied forcing the misbehaving operator to reduce its
transmit power, according to the pre-agreed rules.
In [7], Kumar et al. consider spectrum sharing between
an incumbent and a licensee operator, in the context of CR,
where a third entity acts as a moderator or enforcer. The LO’s
activity is detected by the IO, while the moderator is in charge
of enforcing the sanctions for the licensee, by restricting
its spectrum access for some time. The authors model this
problem as a game theoretic one and show that, by prop-
erly tuning some given parameters, i.e., the cost of violation
reporting for the IO and the penalty for the LO, there is
no incentive for any of the players to misbehave. In other
words, the IO has no incentive to report false interference
from the LO, while the LO would not receive any long-term
benefits from transmitting on the band currently occupied by
the incumbent. However, the study reported in [7] is limited
to a game between an incumbent and a licensee operator; in
our work, we deal with a more complex scenario with several
players, both incumbents and licensees.
A policy enforcement approach for SAS systems has been
proposed in [8], where the authors focus on the spectrum
violations occurring at tier-3–Generalized Authorized Access
(GAA) users–and potentially harming tier-2–Priority Access
License (PAL) spectrum users. In their work, detection is
carried out in a ‘‘crowdsourced’’ manner, i.e., is performed
by a crowd of user terminals distributed in the network. The
authors mainly focus on the detection task, and formulate a
game-theoretical analysis of the enforcement cost, in order
to reduce the number of undetected violations. The concept
of penalization and its consideration for the allocation of
resources is not addressed here.
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With respect to the aforementioned related work, our paper
considers LSA as the underlying spectrum sharing framework
and assumes that both detection and penalization are per-
formed by a central entity, i.e., the DSN and the LSA band
manager, which are part of the LSA framework managing
and controlling the spectrum. From our point of view, this
seems like a natural choice, given that LSA is intrinsically
centralized. Moreover, it is controlled by an impartial actor
that can be trusted by all players (both IOs and LOs). The
idea of integrating the penalty in the assignment of LSA
spectrum to an LO was introduced in [10], where the authors
also investigated the short-term and long-term behavior for
different penalty functions on the LOs’ throughput. However,
there was nomisbehavior detection and the results were based
on simplified simulations. The current work represents the
first attempt that addresses the policy enforcement for LSA in
a comprehensive manner, which includes misbehavior detec-
tion and penalty assignment.
III. PROPOSED LSA NETWORK
In the current section, we describe the components of our
proposed network architecture, which is an extension of the
original LSA framework defined in [4].
A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND TOPOLOGY
We refer to both IOs and LOs as LSA players, as they both can
potentially access the same resources in the available band.
Spectrum sharing among LSA players is managed by the
central controller (CC). There, several components interact
together in order to guarantee that the radio resources are
utilized according to the agreed sharing rules.
In the core of this architecture lies the LSA Band Man-
ager (BM), which coordinates the access of incumbents and
licensees to the available band. The BM decides on how
and to which operator the spectrum is assigned, taking into
account: a) the LSA agreements, b) the requirements and
demands from incumbents and licensees, and c) information
on the current and past usage of the spectrum. The BM is also
responsible for enforcing the agreed policies and assigning
penalties to misbehaving nodes.
The information on the spectrum usage is retrieved from
the LSA repository, which is a database that contains data
on the channel availability and history of spectrum usage by
incumbents and licensees. In addition, it contains the data on
the locations and on the transmit power of each IOs’ and LOs’
transmitters, as well as their antenna patterns.
The network architecture also includes the DSN that
refines the time and spacial granularity of the spectrum
usage database in the LSA repository; in addition, it is used
for the sensing of any unauthorized transmissions over the
LSA bands, thus enabling misbehavior detection of the LOs.
More information on the system’s architecture can be found
in [11]. The topology of our network, including IOs, LOs
and the DSN, over a specified geographical area of interest,
is depicted in Fig. 1.
FIGURE 1. Topology of the proposed network: incumbents and licensees
coexist with the DSN, which serves the purpose of monitoring the
spectrum. The LOs’ base stations, sensors of the DNS, and IO’s
transmitters communicate to the LSA Repository and LSA Band Manager,
where the latter orchestrates the access to the LSA bands.
B. DEDICATED SENSING NETWORK (DSN)
The DSN of our proposed policy enforcement approach is
composed of NS Radio Frequency (RF) powered antennas,
which are randomly distributed over the area of interest aim-
ing at supervising the LO’s activity. The DSN serves the
purpose of sensing and reporting the data regarding the LOs’
spectrum usage to the BM, where such data are further pro-
cessed for misbehavior detection and penalty enforcement.
It should be noted that, even though the sensors are distributed
in the network, their operation is coordinated and controlled
by the BM, which acts as a central entity for the LSA system.
C. RESOURCE SHARING AND POLICY VIOLATION IN LSA
One of the principles that underpins the LSA framework
is that both IOs and LOs should have ‘‘guaranteed spec-
trum access and protection against harmful interference’’ [4].
In other words, spectrum sharing should be orchestrated,
by the BM, in such a way that LOs and IOs do not interfere
one another, so as to guarantee mutual QoS.
Protection against harmful interference is achieved by
making sure orthogonality between LSA players in the
spectral, spatial, and temporal domain is maintained.2 For
example, LOs do not have exclusive access to specific LSA
channels, but each LSA channel in a given area can be used
by several LOs over separate time slots in order to maintain
2In every time slot, LSA resource blocks can be thought of as blocks
on a 3-dimensional grid, which spans over two spatial dimensions and over
frequency.
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orthogonality.3 By allowing LOs to transmit within unused
IO resource blocks, the overall system spectral efficiency can
be increased.
Misbehavior, which we define as an unauthorized trans-
mission over any of the LSA channels, can potentially occur
over the temporal, spatial, or spectral domain. Such unautho-
rized transmissions could be unintentional, e.g., due to faulty
hardware, or could be carried out on purpose, to get access to a
larger amount of resources than the ones assigned by the BM.
In either case, whether intentional or unintentional,4 spectrum
violation leads to harmful interference for the other IOs and
LOs, resulting in an inability to guarantee QoS. In general,
both IO and LO tiers could attempt to access non-granted
resources. However, in this paper, we specifically target the
LSA licensees’ misbehavior.
IV. POLICY ENFORCEMENT APPROACH
The proposed policy enforcement approach consists of three
dominant components: i) a misbehavior detection mecha-
nism, which is carried out by the DSN; ii) the penaliza-
tion of misbehaving users (LOs); and, iii) the allocation of
resources based on each operator’s penalty. We have par-
ticularly focused on the case of LO misbehavior detection
during the time slots in which the IOs are active (trans-
mitting). In other words, we do not consider misbehavior
among LOs (for example, when IOs are inactive). Our policy
enforcement process is depicted in Fig. 2. If LOs do not
misbehave, resources are allocated according to a Round-
Robin (RR) scheduling [12]. However, any other scheduling
policy, or combination of policies, could be used, instead.
It should be noted that the novelty of our proposed approach
3The non-exclusivity of LSA channels for LOs was proposed in the
FP7 Research Project ADEL.
4Distinguishing between intentional or unintentional violation of the spec-
trum usage is not considered in our proposed framework.
FIGURE 2. Block diagram demonstrating the steps of the policy
enforcement strategy for LSA networks. The procedure requires
cooperation between the DSN and the BM: the former carries out sensing
and sends the sensing data to the BM; the latter is responsible for
misbehavior detection, assigning penalties and allocating the shared
spectrum.
lies on the combination of these components for the enhance-
ment of the LSA system, rather than on each individual
technique. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time that such a mechanism is proposed for an LSA network
architecture.
A. MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION
The data collected from the DSN is transferred to the BM,
where a centralized process is initialized. A graphical rep-
resentation of the misbehavior detection process is depicted
in Fig. 3. For the misbehaving activity and its detection,
we have assumed the following:
• All the sensors of the DSNmonitor the spectrum contin-
uously.
• The licensees misbehave only scarcely, due to the fact
that this is an improper activity.5 Thus, the transmitted
signal from the LO’s BSs is modeled as a sparse vector
(with only a few nonzero locations) and the detection is
performed by exploiting the related sparse optimization
techniques [13]. In practice, we consider that less than
20% of the LO’s BS are potentially misbehaving at any
time.
• The channels hn,k ∈ C between the n-th sensor and
the k-th BS are block fading, frequency flat, and are
assumed to be known to the system within a small
symbol interval TS , as also considered in [14]–[16].
• The signal of the IOs is also received at the DSN’s
sensors. However, it is assumed that the IOs do not mis-
behave, and hence, they are excluded from the detection
process.6
The misbehavior detection process is performed in two
phases:
a: PHASE ONE
For the misbehavior detection and due to the nature of the
task, we have selected a sparse optimization approach.7 The
sparse optimization algorithm operates on the signal and
computes an estimate of the transmitted signal, i.e., xˆk (t).
The transmitted signal at time instance t from the k-th BS
(which belongs to a known LO) is denoted as xk (t) ∈ C,
t = 1, . . . ,TS . Since the number of misbehaving (active)
licensees,NT , is much smaller than the number of all possibly
active BSs over the area of interest, M , the transmission
vector containing the signals transmitted from all BSs is
modeled as a sparse one, denoted as x∗(t) ∈ CM . Moreover,
we assume that the status (active/inactive) of the BSs remains
unchanged within the sampling period TS . Thus, the sparsity
level of the transmission vector is guaranteed to be ‖x∗(t)‖0 ≤
NT  M for all t = 1, . . . ,TS , where NT is the maximum
number of LO’s active BSs. The signal sample received at
each n-th sensor is assumed to be of the linear form:
yn(t) = hHn x∗(t)+ vn(t), n = 1, . . . ,NS , (1)
5In the sense that it violates the agreed rules.
6The location of the IOs’ BSs is known.
7Other detection schemes may also be applied.
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FIGURE 3. Misbehavior detection process. The sensors of the DSN first collect the data yn(t) and then forward them
to the LSA band manager. Next, the detection algorithm performs an estimation of possibly unauthorized
transmission. The process is concluded by the classification of the LO’s activity (misbehaving or not) according to an
energy detection over a small symbol period.
where hn := [hn,1, . . . , hn,M ]H characterizes the channels
between the n-th sensor and all possible M locations and
vn(t) is the additive noise assumed i.i.d. with zero mean and
bounded variance, uncorrelated with hn,k . In a more compact
form, equation (1) can be cast as:
y(t) = Hx∗(t)+ v(t), (2)
where y(t) = [y1(t), . . . , yNS (t)]T , HH = [h1 . . . hNS ] and
v(t) = [v1(t), . . . , vNS (t)]T .
For the estimation of the signal, x∗(t), we exploit sparse





s. t. ‖y(t)−Hx(t)‖2 ≤ ε, for all t = 1, . . . ,TS . (3)
The cost function in (3) is non-convex and the optimization
task is known to be NP-hard [17]. Thus, we will attempt to
solve a relaxation of the original task. At each t = 1, . . . ,TS
we solve the Iteratively Reweighted Least Absolute Shrink-
age and Selection Operator (IR-LASSO) [18], [19], whose













1∣∣∣xˆ(i−1)j (t)∣∣∣+  , i = 1, 2, . . . , (5)
where xˆ(0)(t) is the LASSO solution computed by the Soft-
Thresholding with Exact Line search Algorithm (STELA),
which was introduced in [14], and  is a small threshold that
ensures stability. The optimization task attempts to estimate
the unknown sparse vector, iteratively. Usually a few itera-
tions over the index i are sufficient for the convergence of the
method. The method is well studied and enjoys better statisti-
cal properties compared to the LASSO solution. For the solu-
tion of (3) we employ an algorithm that was proposed in [20].
The scheme is known as the Weighted Soft-Thresholding
with Exact Line search Algorithm (WSTELA), which was
based on a refinement of the STELA. Our proposed detection
method attains a high probability of detection and a low
probability of false alarm. In addition, the computational cost
of this method is significantly reduced, compared to other
popular solvers such as the Alternating Direction Method of
Multipliers (ADMM) [21]. More details on the algorithm and
its performance in terms of detection can be found in [20].
b: PHASE TWO
An energy detector operates on the estimated signal and
the activity of the LO is classified as non-misbehaving-
H0 or misbehaving-H1. In order to successfully detect (by
correctly classifying) an unauthorized transmission from an
LO the system should: i) recover the support of the sparse
vector x∗(t) (which reveals the location of the transmitters)
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and ii) compute a good estimate of the transmitted signal’s
values. Instead of applying a standard thresholding technique
on the transmitted signal, we perform an energy detection8 on







where τed (k) is a model-defined threshold depending on the
agreed power transmission levels for each LO. In the simplest
scenario, where no transmissions are authorized by the IO’s
network, τed (k) is set at the noise level for all LOs. For
those BSs that are allowed to transmit, the threshold is set
at the power level allocated by the BM. Since the locations
of the BSs and the channels between each BS and DSN
sensor are known to the LSA BM, and due to the unique
mapping between BSs’ indices and LOs, the misbehaving
LOs can be directly identified from the respective indices.
The detection results, i.e., indices k such that Ek > τed (k),
and the probabilities of detection and false alarm are then
used for determining the severity of the agreement violation
and assigning the penalty.
Remark 1: Another strong advantage of using sparse mod-
elling techniques with respect to non-sparse ones relates to
the size of the DSN. The signal can be detected with fewer
observations, NS , than the size, M , of the unknown vector,
i.e., x∗(t), t = 1, . . . ,TS . Thus, it is possible to reduce
the number of required sensors, and, in such way, provide
cost benefits as well. However, more sensors lead to better
detection results; the probabilities of detection, Pd , and false
alarm, Pfa, depend on the number of sensors that are used
for the detection. Hence, there is a clear tradeoff between
the implementation cost of the DSN and the accuracy of the
estimation that we would like to achieve.
B. PENALIZATION OF THE MISBEHAVING LOS
Whenever an LO is detected to misbehave (classified asH1) a
maximum penalty Amax is applied. Since the probabilities of
detection and false alarm depend on the number of sensors
that are used for the detection, we scale the value of the
penalty according to the confidence level of the misbehavior
detection. Therefore, we set A = (Pd − Pfa)Amax , where
Pd is the average probability of successful detection and
Pfa is the average probability of false alarm. Once applied,
the penalty value reduces over time, following an exponential
decay, as long as the penalized LO does not misbehave again,
according to:
Pnk = Ae−(t−tkn )/λ, (7)
where t is the current time, tkn is the time at which the
previous misbehavior was detected, λ is the half-life time
constant which determines how quickly the penalty decays.
However, if subsequent violations of the sharing rules are
detected, additional penalties are assigned and added to the
8Other methods could also be applied, however, we chose the energy
detector due to its robustness.
current penalty value of the detected LO. Finally, it should
be noted that the average probabilities of detection and false
alarm also depend on the number of transmitting BSs.
C. PENALTY-DRIVEN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
At the final stage of our policy enforcement strategy, we allo-
cate resources to the LOwith the lowest penalty value, if their
values are below a predefined threshold. For operators that
have equal penalties, the allocation is performed according
to Round-Robin scheduling. If an operator’s penalty value,
given by (7), is above the threshold, it is excluded from the
sharing process; in other words, only LOs below the defined
threshold compete for the available resources. On the other
hand, if all players have penalty values above the threshold,
the resources remain unallocated.9 Hence, our enforcement
strategy not only punishes misbehavior but also rewards com-
pliance to the agreed rules.
V. LSA SYSTEM-LEVEL SIMULATOR SETUP
Compared to existing system-level simulators, such as the
Vienna LTE System Level Simulator (SLS) [22], our sim-
ulator shifts the focus towards the components of the LSA
paradigm that are typically absent. The proposed LSA setup
includes the IOs, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) for the
role of LOs, an LSA repository and the BM, as well as a
DSN. In the following, we describe the system blocks and
the models implemented in the LSA simulator and that are
functional to our investigation.
A. BLOCK FEATURES IN THE PROPOSED
LSA SYSTEM SETUP
In the simulator, we have implemented the following features
of the LSA system blocks.
c: FUNCTIONALITIES OF THE LSA BAND MANAGER
• Allocation of the available LSA channels to IOs and
MNOs. Several LSA players can request spectrum,
which is scarce and needs to be allocated in order to
serve the demand and prevent interference. Scheduling
takes into account the spectrum availability, the request
for access by incumbents andMNOs, the previous usage
of spectrum, and possible misbehavior of the MNOs.
• Determining and granting access to the set of BS
cells that an MNO can use. Access to spectrum is
granted on a geographical basis, i.e., MNOs that are
granted resources will be allowed to use only the BSs
that are far enough from the active BSs of IOs in order
to prevent interference. In addition, only some sectors of
a BS might be activated. The BM undertakes the task of
determiningwhichBSs andwhich sectors can be used by
the MNOs. The goal is to ensure that the IOs experience
a satisfactory signal quality.
• Applying policy enforcement. The BM is respon-
sible for the detection of potential misbehavior and
application of a penalty, e.g., by restricting access to
9This does not extend to the Incumbent Operator, which preserves its right
to access the spectrum regardless of the behavior of the LOs.
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spectrum for those players that are found to misbehave.
The penalty attributed to each MNO is applied dur-
ing the scheduling procedure, prioritizing MNOs with
lower, or zero, penalty.
d: LSA REPOSITORY
The repository keeps logs of all the spectrum activities
occurring in the LSA band and, in particular, records of
current geographical usage of every channel for each oper-
ator. In addition, it contains the data on the location of the
transmitters, the transmit power, and the antenna radiation
patterns. All this information is utilized so that we can esti-
mate the potential interference generated by transmitters on
unintended receivers. The LSA repository is accessed by the
LSABM. The data required to build the database are retrieved
from the spectrum users (incumbents and licensees).
e: DEDICATED SENSING NETWORK (DSN)
The DSN of our proposed policy enforcement approach is
composed of 50 sensors, which are randomly distributed over
the area of interest where MNO’s BSs are deployed. For the
detection cycle we have used a value of TS = 10 symbols.
B. SYSTEM-LEVEL SIMULATOR ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe the modules of the system-level
simulator and how they interact with one another. A graph-
ical representation of the proposed simulator architecture is
provided in Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4. Modules of the LSA system-level simulator and their interfaces.
As observed from Fig. 4, the functioning of the simulator
is triggered by an event queue, which keeps records of the
different modules’ activities and operates as a timer for the
LSA BM (which also sets the timer for the entire simulator).
The possible events that are logged in the queue are: (i) the
incumbent activation; and (ii) the allocation of the next LO on
the LSA band. The former event is generated by the incum-
bent module—which implements the IOs and generates their
activity, i.e., it switches them on and off. The latter event
occurs when the allocation period of the LO on the LSA band
is over and another LO needs to be allocated on this band.
The LSA Band Manager module is triggered by the event
queue and allocates the LSA spectrum to the LOs. In addition,
the LSA BM grants LOs access to the LSA spectrum on a
sector-basis. The data regarding spectrum occupancy can be
fetched from the LSA Repository module, which stores the
information on the IO and LO activity over the LSA spectrum.
It should be noted that this allocation takes into account
the current availability of the spectrum (which depends on
the IOs’ activity), its past usage and the policy enforcement
penalty.
Whenever the LSABMblock schedules an LO, the System-
Level Simulator (SLS) engine module produces the results
in terms of throughput, band occupancy and misbehavior
of the LOs. Finally, the Dedicated Sensing Network module
retrieves data regarding the BSs’ activity from the SLS engine
block and performs the misbehavior detection; the outcome
of this process is then fed to the LSA BM for policy enforce-
ment purposes.
C. NETWORK LAYOUT
As a specific application for the incumbent, we assume a
system for video surveillance.10 In the simulator, we model
each IO as a transmitter and a set of 10 receivers uniformly
distributed over a circular area, whichwe call protection zone.
This zone is the area within which the incumbent receivers
should be guaranteed a given signal quality. The incumbent
transmitters, which transmit on a given channel and all with
the same fixed power, can either transmit or remain in a stand-
by (or idle) state: the ratio of the IOs’ activity is defined by
its duty cycle. With reference to Fig. 4, the modeled IO is
implemented in the incumbent module.
The LOs are implemented in the SLS engine module (see
Fig. 4). We assume that each MNO transmits over an exclu-
sively licensed band and over a 5MHz LSA channel, which is
shared between the IOs and several MNOs. We assume that
two MNOs operate in the same band, where, up to five IOs—
distributed across the network—can be active.
The LSA MNOs (licensees) are modelled as three-sector
macro-sites, whose BSs are deployed in a hexagonal grid.
We consider a scenario of 19 sites, arranged in three concen-
tric rings. Each sector is served by a directional antenna and
the transmit power is 43dBm per LSA channel [23].
We model the signal propagation with Extended Hata
model and Rayleigh small-scale fading. In order to limit
the computational complexity associated with the physical
10The LSA framework includes several and various types of users of the
LSA band, which range from military services, radar systems, amateur radio
users, and wireless cameras, etc. [4].
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layer (PHY), we assume a given cell spectral efficiency value,
i.e., whenever a cell is active, its cell spectral efficiency is
constant.
VI. SYSTEM-LEVEL RESULTS
In this section, we present our results from system-level sim-
ulations using the proposed policy enforcement mechanism
for an LSA network. The values of the main parameters used
for the simulation results are reported in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Simulation parameters.
First, we compute and present the average probabilities of
detection and false alarm for several misbehaving BSs. Next,
we present the allocation of resources according to our policy
enforcement approach. Finally, we depict the sensitivity of
the penalty threshold on the allocation of resources.
FIGURE 5. Average probabilities of detection and false alarm, while
varying the number of LO’s misbehaving BSs.
Fig. 5 shows the probabilities of detection and false alarm
for the proposed detection algorithm, i.e., the WSTELA
solver for the IR-LASSO task, while we vary the number of
misbehaving BSs. Our method achieves successful detection
with probability above 90% for up to 30 misbehaving BSs
out of a total of 57 BSs, while it keeps the probability of
false alarm below 10%. It should be noted that for the regular-
ization parameter µ in (4) we have used the cross-validation
FIGURE 6. Change of LSA resource share over time due to changes in the
behavior of the two MNOs. The probability for MNO1 is P(1)mb and for
MNO2 is P(2)mb and changes every 125 simulation steps.
technique in order to find the best values for both algorithms
STELA and WSTELA.
As discussed in Section V-C, the BM may choose to
block the allocation of resources for operators whose penalty
score exceeds a certain threshold value. If all operators’
scores exceed the defined threshold, the LSA resources would
remain unallocated. While this approach leads to an under-
utilisation of the available LSA resources, it strengthens the
incentives for MNOs to comply with the LSA rules.
Fig. 6 shows the allocation of resources to two competing
MNOs over time due to variations on their behavior. The
probability of misbehaving, i.e., P(i)mb, i = 1, 2, for the two
operators varies every 125 simulation steps as follows: for
MNO1 P(1)mb changes from 0.3 in the first 125 steps, to 0.2,
then 0.05 and finally 0 (i.e. full compliance with the LSA
rules); for MNO2 the P(2)mb changes from 0.2 to 0.1, then
0.05, and finally 0.01. The penalty threshold during this
simulation was set to 10. Our policy enforcement algorithm
always benefits the MNO that complies more with the LSA
rules. We emphasize to the fact that misbehavior does not
lead to complete exclusion from the LSA resources. However,
the share of the resources allocated to each misbehaving
MNO is such that, even if misbehavior led to short-term
gains (from unauthorized transmissions), the MNO would
encounter a significant loss over the allocated resources on
the long-term compared to being under full compliance with
the agreed rules. In the case where MNO1 fully complies
with the rules while MNO2 misbehaves with probability
0.01 (time period 375 to 500 in Fig. 6), the allocation algo-
rithm makes sure that all the available resources are fully
utilised, while the complying MNO is further rewarded for
its behavior. Similarly, when both MNOs misbehave with
the same probability (0.05), they both receive equal share of
the available resources, but approximately 10% of the LSA
resources remain unallocated by the BM.
The level of the penalty threshold is key to policy mak-
ing. Fig. 7 shows the average allocation of resources to two
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FIGURE 7. Changing the penalty threshold further penalizes misbehaving
MNOs but can lead to lower utilization of available LSA resources.
MNOs who misbehave with probability 0.3 for MNO1 and
0.2 for MNO2, for different values of the penalty threshold.
The same figure shows the share of resources that remain
unallocated for the defined threshold. It is observed that,
lower values of the penalty threshold lead to MNOs being
severely penalised for not adhering to the LSA rules. With
lower values of the threshold then each MNO has incentives
to complywith the LSA rules, regardless of what otherMNOs
do. This is attributed to the fact that by increasing its own level
of compliance it gains access to a larger amount of resources
that would otherwise remain unallocated. At the same time,
however, a lower threshold may lead to the LSA resources
being underutilised. On the other hand, higher values of the
threshold lead to ‘‘competitive’’ incentives where each MNO
has incentives to misbehave less than other MNOs sharing
the same resources. As depicted in Fig. 7, it is observed
that, higher threshold values lead to better utilization of the
LSA resources; however, lower thresholds create a better set
of incentives against misbehavior from the licensees, which
leads to better overall policy outcomes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a policy enforcement strategy for LSA is
presented. In order to guarantee the reliability of the sys-
tem and moreover provide QoS to its users, we propose
a policy enforcement mechanism that is built within the
sharing network architecture. The general concept is to penal-
ize misbehaving activity from the licensees based on spec-
trum sensing information provided by a Dedicated Sensing
Network (DSN).
The three key components on which the proposed policy
enforcement strategy is built on are: a) the DSN and a mis-
behavior detection algorithm, attaining low probabilities of
misdetection and false alarm (below 10%), b) a penaliza-
tion function that calculates a penalty score for each LO,
and, c) a resource allocation algorithm that allocates the
shared resources taking into account the penalty scores of
the licensees. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time that such a mechanism is proposed in LSA networks.
Furthermore, we provide an open source simulation tool for
spectrum sharing in LSA networks, which performs the entire
policy enforcement procedure.
Through our system-level results we demonstrate that:
a) misbehaving occurrences can be successfully detected by
our proposed mechanism, b) the allocation of resources can
change from the static model of equal allocation to both
misbehaving and non-misbehaving LOs to a more dynamic
one that takes penalty scores into account and c) the severity
of the penalty can be centrally controlled (thus it is fair for all
operators) by the central controller.
We recognize that cases of severe misbehavior may require
regulatory intervention, including financial penalties and
license revoking–an approach that is currently followed by
NRAs for illegal transmissions and harmful interference
management. However, regulatory intervention is typically
time-consuming and incurs significant costs to the NRA.
Our proposed solution provides distinct advantages over the
existing mechanisms because of its near real time response
and shifting of responsibility of misbehavior detection to the
industry as well. We believe that our policy enforcement
strategy could unlock the deployment of spectrum sharing
architectures, such as LSA, for next generation wireless sys-
tems.
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